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1 Introduction
In the modern economy, firms frequently invent and introduce
technologically new products into markets, such as digital cam-
eras, smartphones, memory devices (FD, CD, DVD, USB, and
Cloud), and so on. In some cases, firms release new products
while still producing substitutable products. For example, Kodak
produced both digital cameras and classical cameras, and Apple
sells old and new iPads simultaneously. This action seems nonsen-
sical because newly introduced products generally take demand
away from substitutable existing products. Therefore, how can
we rationalize the firm’s behavior?
To answer this question, we focus on pricing both old and
new products. Essentially, our research question is as follows:
how do firms set a price for such existing products when they sell
new products? The answer is not obvious because there are two
opposite motives for pricing. One is to lower the price of the exist-
ing product. This may maintain demand for the old product but
prevent the proliferation of the new product. The other motive is
to raise price instead, resulting in the loss of demand for the old
product and the proliferation of the new product. In this study,
we examine how these motives interact theoretically.
∗We appreciate comments from Misuzu Azuma, Fumio Dei, Tetsuya
Hoshino, Futoshi Kurokawa, and Sang-Ho Lee. Rui Ota acknowledges the
support of the Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (KAKENHI #21730199 and
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in these studies, new products and their values are given exoge-
nously. That is, firms could not control the proliferation of new
products directly. However, this study contributes to the litera-
ture by allowing the firm to control the proliferation of both new
and existing products to maximize its profits.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we describe the market structure in which a monopoly firm can
produce both old and new products and investigate its pricing
behavior. Section 3 discusses the result and proposes the market
expansion effect as a possible explanation for the result. Section
4 contains our concluding remarks.
2 Model
The model is cast in discrete time and has two periods.1 There is
only one firm in this economy, which produces two goods simulta-
neously: an old product and a new one. This study distinguishes
these products by their durability. We assume that while the new
product maintains its performance for two periods, the old prod-
uct could do so for only one period. This difference comes from
the following observations. In general, a new product’s quality is
superior to the old product. Once consumers purchase the new
product, they usually never buy an old product again. However,
a consumer owning the old product but not the new one may face
a choice between them in every period, because the new product
could potentially increase the consumer’s utility. In other words,
the introduction of a new product would make the old product
1In the long run, a new product will completely replace an old product
because of its technical superiority. Thus, pricing the old product in the near
future would be more important than pricing it farther in the future. A finite
time horizon model could reflect such an idea and keep pricing the old product
still important for the firm.
To achieve this, we construct a dynamic monopoly pricing
model in which only the firm can produce and sell both old and
new products. We focus on a monopoly because only one firm
introduces innovative new products, at least in its early stages.
The difference between the old and new products is durability
and consumers’ marginal willingness to pay. Using the model,
we demonstrate that the monopoly firm will lower the price of
the old product immediately after releasing the new product and
then increase the price, while it will first set the price of the new
product higher and then lower the price. Although it would be
reasonable to set a higher price for the new product because it is
durable, notably, the price of the old product rises, that is, the
firm sets a lower price in the first period. This phenomenon can be
explained by a market expansion effect. A lower price makes the
old product more attractive to consumers. Some consumers buy
the old in the first period, and they will purchase either the old
or the new product in the second period. If the firm sets a higher
price for the old product in the first period, many consumers buy
the new product in this period and buy nothing in the second
period. Lowering the price of the old product in the first period
allows consumers to purchase in both periods, which expands the
market.
In the literature on declining markets, some studies exam-
ine the price paths of the old product, which the new product
replaces. For example, Ota (2011, 2019) investigate that firms
counteract pricing motives by simulation; they lower prices to de-
lay the adoption of a new product and raise prices to exploit price-
insensitive consumers. Yano, Dei, and Ota (2012, 2017) demon-
strate that the price of a product facing declining demand rises
under Cournot competition with free entry and exit. However,
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chasing the new product x is equal to the number of the product
sold. From this interpretation, we know that the total number of
consumers is b/a. The last person, i.e., b/ath consumer, receives
zero utility from the new product.
To highlight the heterogeneity in the preference for the new
product, we assume that consumers are homogeneous in their pref-
erence for the old product. They receive α from purchasing an
old product. The α is the marginal willingness to pay, and it is
common to all consumers. We put b > α as an assumption. This
allows at least one consumer that prefers the new product to the
old intrinsically.
On the production side, this study assumes that there is
only one firm in the economy and this monopoly firm produces
old and new products simultaneously.4 Then, the firm’s strat-
egy is to determine the optimal quantity and the associated price
(qit, p
i
t, t = 1, 2 and j = new, old) to maximize the sum of profits
of the two periods. Since the time horizon is finite, we could solve
the problem backwards.
Given the production of a new good in period 1, xnew1 , the
problem in the second period (t = 2) is defined as follows:
R2 ≡ max pnew2 xnew2 + pold2 xold2
subject to xnew2 + x
old
2 =
b
a
− xnew1 (2)
b− a (xnew1 + xnew2 )− pnew2 = α− pold2 (3)
Equation (2) shows the number of consumers who can purchase
the new or old product in the second period. Since xnew1 con-
4The monopoly assumption could highlight the effect of a newly introduced
product on the existing product. Although investigating oligopolistic cases is
interesting, these cases generate strategic interactions between firms, which
makes the effect of the new product on the price of the existing product
unclear.
attractive for only one period. Therefore, we could distinguish the
products by their durability; consumers utilize the new product
for two periods, but they utilize the old product for one period
only.
We now explain the consumers’ behavior. At the beginning
of the first period, every consumer owns an old product. Then
they choose the new product or the old one in the first period,
when a firm introduces a new product into the market. If con-
sumers purchase the new product in the first period, they do not
buy anything in the second period. However, if they purchase the
old product, they face the same choice in the second period.
This study assumes that consumers are heterogeneous in
preference to the new product.2 This assumption means that con-
sumers evaluate the new product differently; some evaluate the
new product higher than do others. To represent the above idea,
we model the marginal willingness to pay for the new product as
follows:
marginal willingness to pay = b− ax (1)
where a, b > 0 and x is the number of consumers who purchase
the new product. This means that the first consumer purchasing
the new product receives utility of b because nobody purchases
the good before it, i.e., x = 0. A consumer evaluating the new
product second has b − a of marginal willingness to pay. In this
way, every consumer has different marginal willingness to pay for
the new product, which represents the heterogeneity.
We can interpret equation (1) as an inverse demand func-
tion for the new product.3 Since every consumer purchases only
one unit of either of the products, the number of consumers pur-
2Preference to the old product is homogeneous among consumers.
3See Coase (1972).
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two periods. The monopoly firm’s problem is as follows5:
max pnew1 x
new
1 + p
old
1 x
old
1 +R2
s.t. xnew1 + x
old
1 =
b
a
(5)
1
2
{2 (b− axnew1 )− pnew1 }
≥ max
{
(b− axnew1 )− pnew2 , α− pold2
}
(6)
2 (b− axnew1 )− pnew1
= α− pold1 +max
{
(b− axnew1 )− pnew2 , α− pold2
}
(7)
Equations (5) corresponds to (2). Equation (6) is an assumption
on the marginal consumer of the first period. The left hand side is
the average net surplus that the marginal consumer receives over
time and the right hand side is the maximum net surplus of the
consumer next to the marginal consumer in the second period.
The assumption means that in the second period, the marginal
consumer obtains at least a larger net surplus than does the next
consumer. Mathematically, equation (6) defines the relationship
between pnew1 and x
new
1 .
We add some comments on equation (7), which define the
relationship between pnew1 and p
old
1 . Importantly, consumers now
take decisions by considering two periods. The left-hand side in
equation (7) represents the net surplus for the last consumer who
buys a new product in the first period. Since the new prod-
uct is a durable good, its attractiveness continues in the fol-
lowing period. Therefore, we must double the utility from the
new product: 2 (b− axnew1 ). The right-hand side in equation (7)
represents the net surplus when the consumer purchases the old
product in the first period. Again, this consumer must decide in
5Here, for simplicity, we ignore a discount of the future net surplus.
sumers have already bought the new product in the first period,
they do not buy anything in the second. Equation (3) represents
the relationship between the prices of the old and new products,
pold2 and p
new
2 . Since the old product and the new one are substi-
tutable, consumers determine their purchasing decision by the net
surplus. If the net surplus from buying a new product is larger
than that from an old one, consumers buy the new product. How-
ever, consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for the new
product; then, a consumer exists for whom it is equivalent to pur-
chase the new product and the old one. Such a consumer is the
last person who purchases the new product and determines the
number of the new product sold, xnew2 . Therefore, given x
new
1 ,
it must hold that the net surplus from buying the new product
(b− a (xnew1 + xnew2 ) − pnew2 ) is equal to the net surplus from ob-
taining the old one (α− pold2 ), which is equation (3).
We obtain the following solutions for the problem:
pnew2 =
b−axnew1 +α
2 , p
old
2 = α
xnew2 =
b−axnew1 −α
2a , x
old
2 =
b−axnew1 +α
2a
(4)
Note that the price of old product pold2 is equal to the constant
marginal willingness to pay for it, α, because the firm is a monopoly
firm. The joint profit in the second period is R2 =
(b−axnew1 +α)
2
4a .
Given the profit in the second period, the firm sets the
quantity in the first period to maximize the sum of profits for the
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Period 1 Period 2
pnew 11.0 5.5
pold 4.5 5.0
xnew 4.0 0.5
xold 6.0 5.5
Table 2: Numerical example: α = 5, (a, b) = (1, 10)
to understand the monopoly market in which old and new prod-
ucts coexist. The new product cannot survive when the highest
marginal willingness to pay for the new product, b, is sufficiently
low (b < 32α), and the old will exit when b is sufficiently high
(b > 132 α).
From the results, we find dynamic price changes; while the
price of the new product falls in the second period, the price of the
old product rises. Although it would be reasonable to set a higher
price for the new product because it is durable, notably, the price
of the old product rises, that is, the firm sets a lower price in the
first period. Table 1 shows that the price rise occurs just when
the marginal willingness to pay for the new product is not too
low, b ≥ 32α. The old product will face declining demand due to
the introduction of a substitutable new product. The usual sup-
ply and demand analysis when a market is perfectly competitive
and the leftward shift of the demand curve represents declining
demand, could not explain this price rise.
Why does the firm lower the price of the old product? A
possible explanation is the market expansion effect. A lower price
makes the old product more attractive to consumers. Some con-
sumers buy the old product in the first period, and they will
purchase either the old or the new product in the second period.
the second period; switch to the new product or repurchase the
old one. This is reflected by max
{
(b− axnew1 )− pnw2 , α− pold2
}
.
However, it can be simplified. From equation (3), it holds that
b−axnew1 −pnew2 ≥ α−pold2 if xnew2 ≥ 0, which is true by definition.6
Therefore, the equation (3) is rewritten as 2 (b− axnew1 )− pnew1 =
α − pold1 + (b− axnew1 ) − pnew2 . The solutions of the problem are
as follows:
pnew1 =
1
5 (2b+ 7α) , p
old
1 =
1
10 (−2b+ 13α)
xnew1 =
1
5a (3b− 2α) , xold1 = 15a (2b+ 2α)
(8)
3 Discussion
Plugging the optimal xnew1 shown in (8) into (4), we represent
these second-period variables only by parameters. Table 1 sum-
maries the theoretical results and Table 2 provides a numerical
example.
Period 1 Period 2
Price of new product (pnew) 15 (2b+ 7α)
1
10 (2b+ 7α)
Price of old product (pold) 110 (−2b+ 13α) α
Quantity of new product (xnew) 15a (3b− 2α) 110a (2b− 3α)
Quantity of old product (xold) 15a (2b+ 2α)
1
10a (2b+ 7α)
Table 1: Summary of Optimal Prices and Quantities
Restricting the parameters by 132 α ≥ b ≥ 32α, we can guar-
antee that all prices and quantities are positive. Remember that
we originally assume b > α to ensure that there is at least one
consumer who prefers the new product to the old one. Thus,
our restriction implies that the original assumption is insufficient
6We apply this relationship to Equation (6). Thus, it becomes
1
2
{2 (b− axnew1 )− pnew1 } ≥ (b− axnew1 )− pnew2 .
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In the numerical example, although all consumers (b/a = 10 con-
sumers) buy something in the first period, 60% remain in this
market in the second period. If the firm sets a higher price for
the old product in the first period, many consumers buy the new
product in this period and will buy nothing in the second period.
The firm could obtain more profits by letting consumers purchase
in both periods.
4 Concluding remarks
Firms frequently introduce new products into markets. Inevitably,
some firms release new products while still producing substitutable
products. This study investigates how a firm sets the price for ex-
isting products in such a situation. We construct a two-period
durable goods monopoly model (only new product is durable),
and demonstrate that the firm sets a low price for the old prod-
uct in the first period and raises it later. This is profitable because
the market expands; a customer purchases two products in total
(the old product in the first period and the new product in the
second).
Previous studies such as Ota (2011, 2019) and Yano et al.
(2012, 2017) consider imperfectly competitive markets with an ex-
ogenously introduced new product. This study allows the monopoly
firm producing the old product to set a price for the new product
by itself. Therefore, the firm has the power to control the degree
of decline in the demand for the old product. Endogenizing the
degree of decline demand in the model is one of our contributions
to the literature.
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